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Abstract: 
This paper discusses the epistemology of the Internet of Things [IoT] by focusing on the topic of trust. It 
presents various frameworks of trust, and argues that the ethical framework of trust is what constitutes our 
responsibility to reveal desired norms and standards and embed them in other frameworks of trust. The first 
section briefly presents the IoT and scrutinizes the scarce philosophical work that has been done on this subject 
so far. The second section suggests that the field of epistemology is not sufficiently capable of dealing with 
technologies, and presents a possible solution to this problem. It is argued that knowledge is not only social 
phenomena, but also a technological one, and that in order to address epistemological issues in technology, 
we need to carefully depart from traditional epistemic analysis and form a new approach that is technological 
(termed here Techno-Epistemology). The third and fourth sections engage in an epistemic analysis of trust by 
dividing it in to various frameworks. The last section argues that these various frameworks of trust can be 
understood to form a trustworthy large-scale socio-technological system, emphasizing the place of ethical trust 
as constituting our commitment to give proper accounts for all of the other frameworks. 
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This paper discusses the epistemology of the Internet of Things [IoT] by focusing on the topic of trust. It 
presents various frameworks of trust, and argues that the ethical framework of trust is what constitutes our 
responsibility to reveal desired norms and standards and embed them in other frameworks of trust. The struc-
ture of the article is as follows: The first section briefly presents the IoT and scrutinizes the scarce philosophical 
work that has been done on this subject so far. More generally, I argue that an adequate epistemic theoretical 
framework that deals with technology has not yet been developed. The second section suggests that the field 
of epistemology is not sufficiently capable of dealing with technologies, and presents a possible solution to this 
problem. I argue that in order to address epistemological issues in technology, we need to carefully depart 
from traditional epistemic analysis and form a new approach that is technological (termed here Techno-Episte-
mology). The third and fourth sections engage in an epistemic analysis of the concept of trust by dividing it in 
to various frameworks (referred to here as layers). The last section argues that these various layers of trust 
can be understood to form a trustworthy large-scale socio-technological system [LSSTS], emphasizing the place 
of ethical trust as constituting our commitment to give proper accounts for all of the other layers. 
More specifically, the second section introduces individual epistemology's quest for justification in order to 
acquire knowledge, and its relatively recent development of social analysis. Building upon Paul Humphreys’ 
(2009) framework of Network Epistemology, this section criticizes both individual and social epistemology for 
being anthropocentric, and argues that this renders individual and social epistemology unsuitable for a proper 
epistemic analysis of technology. An alternative framework to traditional epistemic analysis, namely Techno-
Epistemology, is introduced and applied to the IoT. By presenting the concept of Scientific Instruments of 
Things [SIoT], a hybrid view of scientific knowledge generation and distribution, for both human and non-
human epistemic agents and their related social and technological processes, is suggested. Epistemic differ-
ences between networks of humans and machines are highlighted in order to raise a dual question of trust: 
how will humans trust the network of the IoT, and how can justified relations of trust form between scientists 
and the SIoT? 
The third section deals with various layers of trust. Beginning with the trust-reliance distinction, the fundamental 
question of whether or not trust relationships between humans (as moral agents) and non-humans (as non-
moral agents) are possible, is discussed. McDowell's (2002) distinction between epistemic trust and social trust 
is presented, and Lehrer's (1995) and Sosa's (2006) accounts of trust are offered in order for human users and 
scientists to epistemically trust the IoT and the SIoT. Next, the ethical dimension of trust is identified as the 
"unseen link" between epistemic trustworthiness and norms and standards. I argue that norms and standards 
should be the focal-points in trust formation. A recent discussion about the topic of trust in the context of the 
IoT (Kounelis et al. 2014) and Nickel's (2013) Entitlement Account, which addresses direct trust in artifacts, 
are brought forward as examples for social processes that can set the technological norms and standards, and 
also as a suggestion of the formation of social trust in the context of technology and knowledge. 
The fourth section discusses techno-trust1 between IoT devices. As a general example, I suggest the formation 
of a reputation system for the IoT and SIoT devices. This system will not only present evidence for trustwor-
thiness for these devices, but will also form a rational basis of trust for human users of the IoT and SIoT. The 
main argument is twofold, and normative: A) An adequate theoretical systematic epistemic framework that 
analyses technology must be developed, and B) The ethical layer of trust is what constitutes our responsibility 
to reveal desired norms and standards and embed them in other frameworks of trust in order to form a trust-
worthy LSSTS. 
 
                                               
1 For methodological reasons epistemological concepts are distinguished from those of the Techno-Epistemological framework by the 
prefix "techno-". 
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A Lack of an Adequate Epistemic Framework for Analyzing the IoT 
The IoT is one of the most popular technology-buzzwords, and with good reason. As an infrastructure upon 
which many applications and services function, the IoT is based on the idea of connectivity, for any thing, any 
place, and any time. It represents real-world objects that are connected in a network, continuously sensing, 
collecting, processing and communicating. When it is joined with technologies that enable ultra-fast connection, 
and that of cloud computing (the idea of providing centralized computer-related services), vast amounts of 
storage memory and processing power are available to the clients – whether they are humans or machines2. 
The idea is not only to transmit live data, for example, the heart rate of a patient to her doctor, but to be able 
to correlate real-time potential events with similarities, correlations, and abnormalities present in the "big data" 
that were processed and mediated through many IoT devices3. While the IoT's sensors "act as the digital nerves 
for connected devices, the cloud can be seen as the brain to improve decision-making and optimization for 
internet-connected actions related to these devices" (van den Dam 2013). 
As technology and technological solutions advance over time, the overlap and convergence between various 
fields of applications (and studies) increase. The IoT represents this kind of convergence and overlap (together 
with cloud computing and ultra-fast broadband network connectivity, as mentioned, among other infrastructure 
technologies) by increasing the amount and sophistication of sensing, processing, and communicating, ulti-
mately enabling us to create knowledge from the vast amounts of collected real-world measurements 
(Stankovic 2014). These technologies already have many applications and its potential applications reach all 
areas of life (for many examples, see ERCIT 2012 and references within). The IoT devices are estimated to 
soon become the largest device market in the world4. However, the realm of philosophy still has not provided 
an epistemic account for the IoT. 
By the same token, an epistemic theory within the Anglo-American analytic philosophical traditions, which deals 
with technology in general, has also not yet been developed5. Such a theory would ultimately enable reflections 
about technological epistemology to be integrated into the philosophical and technical corpus. Since the working 
assumption of epistemology is that knowledge is binary (true or false), and that justification is a matter of 
degree, the more technological knowledge a person has, i.e. "knowledge that is involved in the designing, 
making and using of technical artifacts and systems" (Meijers & De Vries 2009, p. 70), the more a person can 
justify and defend the acceptance of a belief that was formed through the technological artifact. This means 
that the successful application of an epistemological framework that analyzes technology must take technolog-
ical knowledge into its considerations. Nevertheless, technological knowledge was intellectually-historically ne-
glected (Laudan 1984), and as Meijers & De Vries (2009, p. 70) note, "reflections on the nature of technological 
knowledge are fairly recent in the philosophy of technology. In more general epistemological debates, techno-
logical knowledge hardly ever features as an object of serious considerations". This paper constitutes an initial 
step in remedying this situation. 
A Departure from Common and Accepted Views of Knowledge: the Example of 
Network Epistemology and the Generation and Distribution of Knowledge 
After the IoT has been introduced and it was argued that knowledge in technological contexts hardly ever 
features epistemological analysis, this section suggests a reason for the lack of epistemic involvement in the 
                                               
2For technical details see Hassan, Song, & Huh (2009) and Yuriyama & Kushida (2010). 
3Jaffe, Mark. 2014. "IoT Won't Work Without Artificial Intelligence", Wired November 12, 2014. http://www.wired.com/2014/11/iot-wont-
work-without-artificial-intelligence/ 
4Greenough, John. 2014. "The 'Internet of Things' Will Be The World's Most Massive Device Market and Save Companies Billions of Dol-
lars", Business Insider November 5, 2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-internet-of-things-market-will-grow-2014-10 
5Nevertheless, there are epistemologists who analyze technology and depart from common traditional views. This point will be further 
discussed in §2.2. 
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analysis of technology. It also attempts to remedy this situation with an initial epistemic comparison between 
human networks and networks of devices, and the analysis of IoT and Trust. Traditional views of epistemology 
are argued to lack the ability of analyzing current and future networked technologies, such as the IoT and SIoT. 
In contrast, a new kind of epistemological approach, Techno-Epistemology, is presented as a means to epis-
temically analyze technologies. It is argued that knowledge is not only a social phenomenon, but also a tech-
nological one. This section concludes with pointing out some epistemic differences between a group of humans 
and a group of networked devices, such as the IoT or SIoT, in order to lay the groundwork for the next sections 
to discuss the concept of trust, in a technological sense, and reveal the ethical considerations we must take in 
respect to trust in the IoT. Let us begin by briefly presenting the historical development of individual and social 
epistemology, and one of its criticisms, namely anthropocentric bias. 
The Quests of Individual and Social Epistemology 
Defined widely, epistemology is the study of knowledge. Though various kinds of knowledge exist, such as 
knowing a place, a person, or how to do something (like swimming), the scholarly interests of Anglo-American 
analytic epistemologists traditionally focus more narrowly - on the knowledge of propositions. (Steup 2014) 
That is, if people know what they believe, they would easily agree that a subject S knows a proposition P only 
if S believes that P. However, since Greek antiquity, a belief is not considered to be a sufficient condition. Since 
then, it was generally agreed that a subject S knows a proposition P only if S believes P, and in addition - that 
P is true. Similar to Socrates’s arguments in Meno and in the Theatetus, if a person, out of the blue, supersti-
tiously, or luckily guesses something that happens to be true, we would not consider the true belief as 
knowledge. The true belief must be tied to something else – a justification. Epistemologists referred to justifi-
cation as that missing "something else", and as part of the three conditions for knowledge – justified, true 
belief [JTB]. 
After centuries of absence from intellectual discourse, the problem of what that "something else" is - has re-
emerged. The JTB account of knowledge was refuted by Edmund Gettier’s (1963) influential (among episte-
mologists) paper which introduced counter-examples to the (then) widely-accepted view. Gettier’s argument, 
that one can have a JTB that is not knowledge, sparked the interest of epistemologists. Ever since, many new 
theories of knowledge were, and still are, being proposed, and have attempted to add more conditions or 
change the notion of justification.6 
It was only relatively recently that philosophers began to engage with social epistemology7. Social epistemology 
deals with the social dimensions of knowledge. Generally, the term "knowledge", in its social sense, refers to 
epistemic content that has passed social processes, but the meanings of “social” and “knowledge” are both 
debatable. Scholars of social epistemology can be placed on a spectrum: those whose work is in keeping with 
the tenets of traditional individual epistemology, and those who depart from it. The first are referred to as 
classical social epistemologists or as the orthodox camp. They focus on concepts such as truth and rationality, 
and the ways in which an individual acquires knowledge or justified belief in social contexts. They build upon 
individual (general) epistemology and extend its scope to the social. The latter, anti-classical social epistemol-
ogists, or reformists, hold that knowledge, similar to language, is found within a community. They focus on 
collective doxastic agents or groups as another ontological level of knowledge bearing. The more extreme 
trends on this side of the spectrum, the revisionist camp, even reject the traditional focus on concepts such as 
justification or rationality. They "posit the social, practical, and empirical fruits of inquiry, rather than truth, as 
the standards of normative epistemic appraisal" (Miller forthcoming). 
                                               
6 This phenomenon has received an epithet label within scholar discussions, academic syllabuses, and publications – Gettierology. See 
Shope (1983) for the intellectual history of this quest. 
7 For the development of social epistemology, see Goldman & Blanchard (2012) and Miller (forthcoming). 
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Departing From Traditional Epistemology 
Dealing with a wide variety of sources and processors of knowledge and justifications, such as sophisticated 
scientific instruments or computer software, significantly affects "our notion of science and scientific interpre-
tation of the world, driving at the same time the philosophical debate[s]" (Primiero 2014, abstract). To a large 
extent, part of our knowledge, like many of our beliefs, is acquired, transmitted, generated, and mediated in 
and through technologies. Various scholars, theories, and approaches, outside of traditional epistemology at-
tribute morality or the ability to know to technological artifacts. These views can be found within the fields of 
machine ethics (Torrance 2009), artificial intelligence (Tonkens 2009), and information ethics (e.g. Capurro 
2000; Capurro & Hjørland 2003; Wallach & Allen 2009; Floridi & Sanders 2004). These views are also held by 
a number of scholars in Science and Technology Studies (e.g. Winner 1985; Latour 1992), phenomenologist 
philosophy, as well as some scholars who deal with information communication technologies. While attributing 
technology with the ability to know may be trivial to many scholars, traditional Anglo-American analytic episte-
mology, whether individual or social, does not attribute knowledge to artifacts. Individual epistemology con-
cepts such as belief, proposition, memory, and causal reasoning, as well as social epistemology concepts such 
as testimony, evidence, and trust, are anthropocentric. 
To a lesser degree, the ability to outsource knowledge (and understanding) to digital devices (e.g. via algo-
rithms) is the defining feature of some philosophical approaches to technology (such as phenomenological 
digital ontology, see Eldred 2011; Compton 2009). It can be said that an analog to this outsourcing is found 
within the field of epistemology: some reformist social epistemologists do accept that mental states and cogni-
tive processes extend beyond our organisms to other humans and artifacts8. As some scholars utilize traditional 
concepts, in general, to analyze knowledge from technology (e.g. Kourken 2014; Record 2013), this kind of 
analysis is not commonly found and is mostly believed to be limited. For example, David Coady, whose focus 
is applied epistemology, wrote in the preface to his (2012) book What to Believe Now: 
The information revolution and the knowledge economy have radically changed the way that 
we acquire knowledge and justify our beliefs. These changes have altered our epistemic land-
scape as surely as the sexual revolution and breakthroughs in reproductive technology have 
changed our moral landscape. The latter changes provided a good deal of the impetus for the 
applied turn in ethics, but the former changes have so far failed to result in a comparable turn 
in epistemology. Such a turn is surely inevitable. (p. 2, emphasis added) 
Given the wide range of approaches to the relationship between technology and knowledge, how can episte-
mologists consider the place of technologies in various epistemic processes? Humphreys (2009) criticizes indi-
vidual and social epistemological frameworks for being "infused with anthropocentric concepts" (p. 221). His 
criticism, based on the view that epistemology might be outdated, argues that today's technologies are looked 
to and used as sources of knowledge, as if they possess it: "[...] we do speak of computers storing and pro-
cessing knowledge as well as information, language that is not just metaphorical. Printed books contain 
knowledge and so do their on-line versions" (ibid).  
Revisionist social epistemologists seek to revise traditional epistemic notions for the epistemic analysis of 
knowledge and technology. For example, Baird (2004) developed material epistemology, and argued that 
(some) scientific instruments are a form of material objective knowledge and referred to them as "thing 
knowledge". Among the properties of thing knowledge is that it expresses the knowledge of their designers. 
Therefore, among other implications, technological knowledge is not belief-based, but thing-based9 (for epis-
temic concerns, see Pitt 2007 and Kletzl 2014; for social concerns, see Cavicchi 2005). Other suggestions 
                                               
8 This is the internalism-externalism debate within epistemology regarding belief justifications that is parallel to the philosophy of mind 
internalism-externalism debate regarding the spatial location of cognitive processes and mental states (see Carter, Kallestrup, Palermos & 
Pritchard 2014). Externalists mostly rely on the extended cognition hypothesis (Clark 2007), the extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers 
1998), and the distributed cognition hypothesis (Hutchins 1995). 
9 Within the phenomenological tradition, Eldred (2011, pp 61-62) recognizes know-how as a kind of understanding which is deeper than 
knowledge. He used a potato peeler as an example for outsourcing know-how knowledge (of peeling potatoes) to material design: "A 
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include different Truth criteria, such as effectiveness or efficiency, have also been raised (e.g. Houkes 2006). 
Nevertheless, technological knowledge (see §1.) is described as "epistemologically unusual" (Ibid). This makes 
the analysis of knowledge from technology much more complex (see §3.3.) 
Techno-Epistemology in Brief 
Whether or not epistemological approaches are correct in adhering to an anthropocentric approach to technol-
ogy, they are nevertheless capable of applying their (limited) analyses on issues of technology. As mentioned 
before (§2.2.), these kinds of analyses are not commonly found. As Miller & Record (2013, p. 121) point out: 
"despite our vast and deep dependence on technology for acquiring knowledge and justified belief, epistemol-
ogy has not, for the most part, given serious thought to the role technology plays in the fabric of knowledge 
and justification". 
Some areas of science such as robotic astronomy, parts of experimental high energy physics, and parts of 
genomic analysis, can be said to present instruments that collect data that is processed by computers without 
any intervention by humans (Humphreys 2009). The trend of purely automated processes, carried out by sci-
entific networks of instruments and computers, is increasing. The same thing could be said about the IoT and 
its usage within the scientific domain. Scientists and scholars will not only develop and discuss the IoT, but will 
also use it for their own research – as scientific instruments that create and measure phenomena. Let us refer 
to the IoT devices that can be applied to a scientific use, such as the aforementioned purely automated pro-
cesses, as Scientific Instruments of Things [SIoT]. In order to epistemologically address the IoT, SIoT, and 
technologies in general, we need to carefully depart from the traditional individual and social epistemological 
layers of analysis, and without rejecting them form a new one – technological. Let us refer to this layer as 
Techno-Epistemology (see table 1). 
Table 1. A Proposal for a New Epistemic Approach 
Layers of 
epistemic 
analysis 
Techno-Epistemology 
Social Epistemology 
Technological 
Individual Epistemology 
Social 
Unit of 
analysis Individual 
Techno-Epistemology's layer of analysis can take into consideration the individual, social, and technological 
units of analysis. 
Knowledge Generation and Distribution: Epistemic Differences Between Social and 
Technological Analysis 
Miller & Pinto (in progress) note three major, fundamental and widely-accepted views of the generation and 
distribution of scientific knowledge: Kitcher's (1990) description of apt division of cognitive labor among re-
searchers, Longino's (2002) description of the social process of critical scrutiny and evaluation, such as peer 
review, that information must undergo in order to acquire the status of knowledge, and Hardwig's (1985) 
cornerstone paper about justified relations of trust among researchers. 
This paper offers an in-principle epistemic symmetry between human and non-human epistemic agents regard-
ing the generation and distribution of scientific knowledge. Since the generation and distribution of knowledge, 
in general, are not only social processes, but also technological processes, we are behooved to extend, or even 
revise, our epistemic views. A hybrid view of knowledge generation and distribution, for both human and non-
human epistemic agents, as well as both the social and the technological processes involved, is needed in order 
to properly epistemically analyze technologies in general, and the IoT in particular. The future trend of SIoT 
                                               
better potato peeler is the embodiment of a better, more efficient potato-peeling know-how" (p. 62). Within the analytic tradition, other 
examples for revisionist social epistemologists are, for example, Chang (2004) and Humphreys (2004).  
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exemplifies technologies which take part in the generation and distribution of scientific knowledge. Techno-
Epistemological analysis that takes into account the major epistemic differences between networks of humans 
and machines, as Humphreys (2009) initially suggested, in the context of the networked devices of the IoT and 
the SIoT is proposed. 
While no single scientist can directly access the knowledge of another peer, SIoTs may have direct access to 
networked knowledge. Also, the network of SIoT can perform a kind of a "thought transfer", to a degree that 
a device inside the network can reason or conclude from the data, information, or knowledge that is transferred, 
generated, or directly accessed through the network. Another major epistemic difference is the kind of subjec-
tivity that is common among scientists’ beliefs and background beliefs regarding scientific knowledge: while a 
humanitarian belief regarding science cannot always be explicitly expressed and communicated (and if so, it is 
sometimes considered subjective), the propositions of machines or models that take part in the SIoT can be 
explicitly expressed. 
Finally, the network of the SIoT can, in principle, epistemically act as a single agent, while a community of 
scientists exchanging knowledge will not act as immediately and as directly as the networked SIoT. Given the 
differences between human networks and networks of IoT and SIoT, how can human users trust the networked 
devices of the IoT, and how can justified relations of trust form between scientists the SIoT? 
Trust as a Cornerstone Characteristic in the Construction of the IoT 
In the previous sections, this paper argued that individual and social epistemologies are anthropocentrically 
biased, and therefore insufficient for analyzing networked technologies. The framework of Techno-Epistemol-
ogy was proposed as a third epistemic approach that can be used to analyze networked technologies such as 
the IoT and SIoT. The next section points out the ethical considerations of Techno-Epistemology through the 
prism of the topic of trust. It begins by presenting the commonly-found distinction between trust and reliance, 
and the various approaches that different fields of inquiry take toward it. I show that epistemology considers 
the possession of human qualities that enable morality to be a fundamental requirement for an epistemic agent 
to trust or to be trusted. Other accounts of agents that require human qualities to lesser extents are presented. 
By building on those other accounts, this paper presents the concepts of trust regarding epistemic agents in a 
way that avoids the anthropocentric bias of traditional epistemic requirements. This results in a different epis-
temological perspective that opens up for analysis conceptions of trust outside of the traditional relationships 
formed exclusively between human beings. In light of this perspective, the epistemic, social, and ethical layers 
of trust are discussed. Section 4 will present Techno-Trust in the context of the layers of trust discussed in 
Section 3, and Section 5 will conclude by presenting the formation of a trustworthy LSSTS. 
The Trust-Reliance Distinction and Non-Moral Epistemic Agents 
In recent years, the concept of trust has been widely discussed in many academic contexts and disciplines, 
mostly in computer science, management, and business10. Different applications and understandings of trust 
have developed across the many fields in which it is discussed. In epistemology, the topic of trust is mostly 
discussed within the context of testimonial accounts of knowledge11, though "there are a number of philosoph-
ical questions that arise in relation to the concept of trust, both because of the intrinsic interest of the topic, 
and also because it is so fertile a perspective from which to approach different topics related to the way we 
live together" (Simpson 2012, p. 566).12 
                                               
10 As indicated by Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science. Search criteria: Topic: “Trust”, Timespan: All years, Indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, 
A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH. 
11 Though the concept of testimony is not elaborated in this paper, it is shortly discussed in §4 and footnotes 16 and 18. 
12 Simpson (2012) notes that "the philosophical literature on trust remains slim indeed" (p. 550), that "there is no single phenomenon 
that ‘trust’ refers to" (p. 551), and makes the case that the concept of trust is not amenable to conceptual analysis as it is as an umbrella 
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The spectrum of the extent to which a notion of trust can be applied to non-humans – such as technological 
artifacts, scientific instruments, or even LSSTS’s – ranges according to the discipline's accepted views. As men-
tioned before (§2.2.), at one extreme, scholars within the field of Science and Technology Studies [STS] argue 
that technological artifacts possess a form of agency of their own (canonical examples are Winner 1985 and 
Latour 199213). In the corpora of a few disciplines, such as information ethics (e.g. Wallach & Allen 2009; Floridi 
& Sanders 2004), machine ethics (Tonkens 2009), and artificial intelligence (Torrance 2011), it is acceptable 
and common for a non-human epistemic agent to act as a moral agent, and therefore to be able to trust or be 
trusted (e.g. Tavani 2014). 
At the other extreme, some philosophers of technology, famously influenced by Joseph Pitt's "technology is 
humanity at work" (2010, p. 445, originally emphasized; see 1983 for the original formulation) tend to take an 
opposite viewpoint, and reduce questions regarding trust in technologies to questions regarding trust in the 
humans which are "behind" these technologies, such as designers or engineers. Within normative ethics and 
epistemology discourses, the general and accepted view is that a human cannot form trust relationships with 
a non-moral agent. Trust, many hold, is founded on a human quality, such as rationality, consciousness, free 
will, intentionality, and so forth. For example, Jones (1996, p. 14) stated that "trusting is not an attitude that 
we can adopt toward machinery […] One can only trust things that have wills, since only things with wills can 
have goodwills". The latter camp argues that though we cannot trust technological artifacts, we can rely on 
them: "reliance is way of acting, whereas trust is an attitude" (Nickel 2013, p. 224 fn 3). Trustworthiness, unlike 
reliability, is "the opportunity for the trustee to act against the wishes of the trustor and the trustee’s consid-
eration of the value of the trust that has been placed in them by the trustor" (Wright 2010, abstract).  
The trust-reliance distinction, in its technological context, focuses on the question of whether or not trust 
relationships, involving both humans (as moral agents) and non-humans (as non-moral agents), are possible. 
Human qualities required for such a relationship, such as those stated above, are not (yet) possessed by 
technological artifacts, which cannot be considered as moral agents – and therefore cannot be considered 
trustable. 
The late Edsger Dijkstra, a computer scientist, once said that "the question of whether machines can think [...] 
is about as relevant as the question of whether submarines can swim"14. The same could be said about many 
human activities. The case of trust exemplifies the limits of epistemology in its considerations of non-humans. 
More generally, "it seems that the difficulties [...] lie in the tendency of standard epistemology to analyze 
knowledge in terms of human beings’ properties" (Miller & Record, p. 121). 
However, it is possible to build upon conceptual epistemological advances that have been made regarding 
technological artifacts. For example, Johnson (2006) does not consider technological artifacts to be moral 
agents, but argues that they do have "moral efficiency" and therefore qualify as "moral entities". Floridi (2011) 
argues that autonomous technological artifacts (what he terms Autonomous Artificial Agent) can be moral 
agents since they can function as “sources of moral action” and are able to cause moral good or harm (Tavani 
2014). The corpus that has dealt with the question of whether a technological artifact can be considered a 
moral agent is large enough to advance non-traditional views of moral technological agents. For example, 
Johansson (2013) lists various views about the possibility of an action that can “originate inside an artifact, 
considering that it is, at least today, programmed by a human” (p. 295). 
Whether or not Techno-Epistemology, as a new epistemic layer of analysis, departs from the anthropocentric 
conceptions prevalent in individual and social epistemology and treats technological artifacts as epistemic 
agents, it can still analyze the role technology takes in knowledge and justification made by human(s). If it 
                                               
term. I embrace this view; the various contents of the concepts of trust presented here are not necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
definition. 
13 Though other STSers such as Bloor (1999) and Collins (2010) have argued that humans differ from non-humans in the context of justi-
fication. 
14 Dijkstra, Edsger W. 1984. "The threats to computing science", Lecture delivered at the ACM 1984 South Central Regional Conference, 
November 16-18, Austin, Texas, USA. Transcript available at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/transcriptions/EWD08xx/EWD898.html 
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does depart from prevalent anthropocentric conceptions, it is inherent that the non-human epistemic agents 
(devices, instruments, algorithms, etc.), which can be regarded as outsourced human knowledge, can norma-
tively expect that information from other sources be transmitted in a certain standardized form.15 Without 
rejecting individual and social epistemology, Techno-Epistemology holds that relations of techno-trust can be 
formed between two non-moral agents, and between non-moral and moral agents. It is possible only if an 
epistemic agent, human or not, expects information to be provided in certain forms, and its attitude is affected 
by the information received. This point will be further elaborated in light of social epistemology's concept of 
testimony in Section 4. 
By presenting the trust-reliance distinction, the concept of trust was presented as polysemous among various 
disciplines. By avoiding the anthropocentric bias of traditional requirements for morality or human qualities, it 
is possible to discuss trust not only as a relationship between two human beings, but also between humans 
and devices, as well as between devices. The next section begins with a distinction between epistemic and 
social trust, and present ethical trust as a link between these two.  
Trust Between Humans and the Networked IoT 
McDowell (2002) distinguishes between epistemic trust and social trust, and argues that they are deeply re-
lated. While epistemic trust regards justification of beliefs in propositions made by an epistemic agent, social 
trust “[…] is trust that someone will act co-operatively, or with one’s best interests in mind, and in accordance 
with the social mores of the society or situation in which the participants find themselves” (p. 54). For example: 
I epistemically trust Adam, a know-it-all character - his statements are (probably) true. I do not socially trust 
Adam that he will keep it to himself if I ask him about Michelle. I socially trust my library not to share my loan 
history list with advertisers from the local book industry. Social trust can raise the amount of information 
interaction, as it "involves moral, personal or cultural dependability, or some combination of these" (p. 54). 
Part of the upcoming challenge is not only to construct the IoT devices to be epistemically trustworthy by 
indicating that its truth statements are right (i.e. epistemic trust), but also to construct the system, as a whole, 
as trustworthy (i.e. social trust). This challenge would likely involve a wide variety of characteristics to consider. 
Such a characteristic might be, for example, transparency regarding the relevant information and processes 
disclosed: "in order to critically assess epistemic agents, content and processes, we need to be able to access 
and address them" (Simon 2010, p. 343).  
The Formation of Epistemic Trust Between Humans and the IoT 
Lehrer (1995) offers the Evaluation Model of Instrumental Knowledge for explaining the structure of justification 
for trustworthiness. Among the essential features of instrumental knowledge, is the acceptance of the trust-
worthiness of the instrument and its output as truth. In order to know p through the use of an instrument, a 
person must have a trustworthy basis for the evaluation of the belief and defend its acceptance against objec-
tions. But what is that trustworthy basis for the evaluation of the belief? Sosa (2006) presents an account of 
how not only our senses are reliable, but instruments as well16: a non-human technological artifact is reliable 
when a human subject has an indication that the artifact indicates the truth outright and accepts that indication. 
It is possible, then, to consider what a framework for the formation of epistemic trust in the IoT and SIoT might 
look like. In order for a human subject (or a scientist) S to form epistemic trust in the IoT’s (or in the SIoT's) 
                                               
15 For additional approaches which take this direction, see Buechner & Tavani (2011). 
16 Sosa (2006) argues that testimonial knowledge presupposes instrumental knowledge by using the instrument of language. Conse-
quently, instrumental knowledge, including testimonial knowledge, cannot be reduced to non-instrumental knowledge: "Our access to the 
minds of others is after all mediated by various instruments, and we must trust such media at least implicitly in accessing the testimony 
all around us" (p. 118, originally emphasized). For the contrary view, see Goldberg (2012). See also §4 and footnote 18 for more on tes-
timony in technological context. 
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devices' output, S must have an indication that the device indicates the truth, and accepts that indication. In 
addition, S must be able to defend the acceptance of the belief against objections. This means that knowledge 
regarding how the device resulted with its outcome, meaning technological knowledge, is needed. 
The Ethical Dimension of Trust 
The formation of trust is, in itself, ethical, but what is the ethical dimension of trust and what is its relation to 
epistemic and social trust? The ethical dimension of trust can serve as a link between epistemic and social trust. 
Wagenknecht (2014) argues that the moral dimension of trust does not involve doubts concerning the epistemic 
trustworthiness of a collaborator, i.e. the risk of doubts concerning the true or false value of a proposition. 
Instead, it involves "the deliberate will to take this risk and to resort to a number of measures that can mitigate 
it" (p. 85). By referring to "institutional trust, i.e. trust in community-borne gate-keeping functions, [the truster] 
can partly compensate for a lack of familiarity with potential collaborators" (ibid). 
This lack of familiarity, which happens when a truster needs to co-operate with an unknown epistemic agent, 
forces trusters to rely on social norms and standards. Since trust is usually not something measured, but is 
rather an attitude expressed by one epistemic agent towards another, that attitude is mostly invisible. As Marsh 
& Briggs (2009, p. 10) stated: "like light, trust is seen in its effect on something, and in between truster and 
trustee, there is simply nothing to see". 
Kiran & Verbeek (2010) argued that it is possible to actively engage in the technological processes that impact 
us. Trust, according to their argument, takes on the character of confidence: we trust ourselves to technology. 
This means our concern should be "how to take responsibility for the quality of technological mediations, and 
of our ways of living with these mediations" (p. 425). The ethical dimension of trust, which can be identified as 
the “unseen link” between epistemic trustworthiness and the social norms and standards which lets trusters 
take the risk of doubt, is where the challenge of social trust is focused: how can these social norms and 
standards be institutionalized, and how can they be embedded within the network of the IoT? Norms and 
standards are, after all, not only social but technological as well. The goal of making these norms and standards 
explicit, and the question of what are these norms and standards are, are left open for future experts, special-
ists, and users, to achieve and answer. With these answers it is possible to gain social, technological, and LSSTS 
kinds of trust. 
The Formation of Social Trust Between Humans and the IoT 
Kounelis et al. (2014) discuss the topic of trust in the context with the IoT. Their focus is not epistemological, 
but social and technical, mostly oriented toward democracy and security. By using the concept of "citizen", and 
not "user", they highlight that "the human capacity to maintain autonomy and control in a world of pervasive 
human-technological networking should be considered as an essential part of our ethical and legal endowment 
and entitlement in IoT" (p. 74). They suggest that by using a framework named SecKit (Security Kit), it is 
possible for citizens to adopt a collaborative approach to address various issues that regard the IoT, such as 
privacy or data protection (p. 77). Collaborations between humans, in order to pinpoint which technical and 
technological issues are important, increase the amount of information interaction, and form social trust be-
tween human users (or citizens, in Kounelis et al.'s case) and the IoT. 
Nickel et al. (2010) recognize that any applicable notion of trustworthiness to technology must depart signifi-
cantly from the notion of trustworthiness associated with interpersonal trust17. Nickel's (2013) account of trust 
involves trusting not only in the humans behind the technologies, but also in institutions. Though not all kinds 
of trust in technologies can be reduced to the humans and institutions behind them, he offers the Entitlement 
Account that makes sense of trust in technological artifacts. Two kinds of evidence will assure this kind of trust, 
                                               
17 See also Lahno (2004) for three accounts of interpersonal trust. 
IRIE 
International Review of Information Ethics Vol. 22 (12/2014) 
Ori Freiman: 
Towards the Epistemology of the Internet of Things 17 
by indicating that the designers have strong interests in serving the interests of the users: 1) A failure to 
perform will lead to an effective sanction by institutional structures, and 2) others are willing to stake their 
reputations on the technologies' performances. Both approaches exemplify how social processes can alter the 
technological norms and standards. In order to form relations of trust with technological artifacts and with the 
IoT in particular, we must pay constant attention not only to the social, but also the technological norms and 
standards which regard trust. 
Techno-Trust by a Reputation Cloud 
In the preceding sections, the formation of epistemic trust between humans and instruments, as well as the 
formation of social trust, were discussed. The ethical layer of trust was identified as the “unseen link” between 
the two. This section extends the ethical layer of trust by offering an epistemic account of trust between 
machines, referred to here as Techno-Trust. To exemplify Techno-Trust, I suggest a reputation system upon 
which IoT and SIoT can form evidence-based trust relations.  
Goldberg (2012) rejected the possibility that a non-human can reliably receive testimony from instruments. 
According to his view, to "rely in belief-formation on another speaker is to rely on an epistemic subject, that is, 
on a system which itself is susceptible to epistemic assessment in its own right, whereas 'mere' instruments 
and mechanisms are not properly regarded as epistemic subjects in their own right, they are not susceptible to 
normative epistemic assessment" (p. 182, emphasis added). Goldberg distinguished between instrument-based 
beliefs and testimony-based beliefs. The latter belong to epistemic subjects in their own right, "susceptible to 
full-blooded normative assessment" (p. 191), and "sophisticated enough to satisfy the conditions on being 
appropriately assessed in terms of rationality and responsibility" (p. 194). Without rejecting this view, the 
epistemic approach of Techno-Epistemology in principle deals with testimonies received by non-human epis-
temic agents that are not "full-blooded"18. 
Sometimes "a person is not trusting another person but is instead trusting the community to which they both 
belong to tell them whether or not trust can be given [...] If someone does not live up to the community 
expected standards, then [the trustee] receives bad reviews, lowering their reputation" (Lawrance 2009, p. 
327). According to this view, whenever expectations are not met, the reputation of the trustee is lowered, and 
potential trusters would gradually cease to trust the poorly reviewed epistemic agent. 
By adopting this reasoning, the suggestion is to form a reputation system for devices, which serves as a provider 
of explicit qualitative and objective measurements of the trustworthiness, as reflected by the characteristics of 
the device in question. This reputation system can be seen as a basis for the formation of techno-trust relations 
between devices of the IoT. Moreover, if evidence for trustworthiness is available to a human truster, a rational 
basis for trust can be formed (Simpson 2011; for the analysis of reputation as phenomenological phenomena, 
see Eldred 2013). 
Since most interaction within the network of the IoT and SIoT is machine-to-machine interaction, the basic 
idea is to form a system that will assist devices in choosing their sources: the devices rate the interactions with 
each other on the basis of their observed and measured behavior, and base their interactions on these ratings.19 
In this way, each device “consults” the reputation cloud for the necessary information that is crucial for its own 
decision making, beyond an evaluation of how well they perform the tasks they were designed for. For example, 
for one type of device, the normative expectation to get a result immediately might be the main characteristic 
of trust, while for another, the frequency of sensors calibration, or the kind of lens it has, might be the crucial 
factors for the automated decision making process. Through this method a device will improve (or worsen) its 
                                               
18 Miller & Record (2013, p. 121, fn 3) correctly stated that "the question of whether and on what conditions information from computers 
and other instruments constitutes testimony has been largely overlooked". For exceptions, see references within and footnote 16 of this 
paper. 
19 For a survey of multi-agent trust models, see, e.g., Han et al. (2013); and for a survey of surveys, see Pinyol & Sabater-Mir (2013). 
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reputation for various functions, and thus acquire (or revoke) its ability to be techno-trusted by other IoT 
devices.20 
Conclusion: The Formation of Trustworthiness in Large-Scale Socio-
Technological Systems 
Let us briefly recall the various accounts of rely and trust. Epistemic trust is assured by Sosa’s (2006) Basis for 
the Evaluation of the Belief which holds that a technological artifact is reliable when a human subject has an 
indication that the artifact indicates the truth outright and accepts that indication. Building on the trustworthy 
basis for the evaluation of the belief, Lehrer’s (1995) Evaluation Model of Instrumental Knowledge demands an 
ability to defend the acceptance of the belief against objections. 
Social trust is exemplified by Kounelis et al.’s (2014) suggestion for citizens (human users) to maintain their 
autonomy and control by adopting a collaborative approach to address various social issues relating to the IoT. 
Social trust can also be ensured by Nickel's (2013) suggestion for evidence that humans behind the technolo-
gies, such as designers and manufacturers, have strong interest in serving the interests of the users. This can 
be indicated by effective sanctions levied by institutional structures, in the case of a failure, and by the fact 
that others are willing to stake their own reputation by using the technology. Both approaches exemplify how 
social norms and standards affect technological norms and standards. 
The IoT devices rate the interactions with each other on the basis of their observed and measured behavior, 
and base their interactions on these ratings. This kind of reputation system presents evidence for trustworthi-
ness, forming techno-trust between devices, and serves as a basis for the rational formation of trust in these 
devices by humans. The reputation system can be seen as the embedment of standards in the network of the 
IoT. The trustworthiness of a LSSTS, then, is assured by all layers of trust. 
The main arguments were that an adequate theoretical, systematic epistemic framework that analyzes tech-
nology must be developed, and that the ethical layer of trust is what ties the other layers discussed in this 
paper. Ethical trust, or the deliberate will to take epistemic risks by referring to social trust, to use McDowell’s 
(2002) distinction, is the dimension of trust which lets trusters take the risk of doubt by leaning on social norms 
and standards (Wagenknecht 2014). These social norms and standards affect technological norms and stand-
ards. It was claimed that trust is "unseen" (Marsh & Briggs 2009) and that we have the responsibility to actively 
engage in technological processes (Kiran & Verbeek 2010). Therefore, "unseen" desired norms and standards 
regarding trust, both social and technological, must be revealed, explicitly expressed, institutionalized, and 
embedded in the network of the IoT. They should be implemented in our collaborative use of technologies, the 
activities of institutions, and the design of technological artifacts. These norms and standards set the level of 
epistemic, social, technological, and LSSTS trust. The ethical dimension of trust constitutes a link between 
epistemic trust and other layers of trust. It constitutes our responsibility to reveal desired trust-related social 
and technological norms and standards and embed them in other frameworks of trust. 
                                               
20See Marsh & Briggs (2009) for formalizations, as computational concepts, of regret and forgiveness in the context of trust. For more 
on reputation in the context of the cyberworld, see special issue of International Review of Information Ethics, vol 19. 
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Table 2. Frameworks of Trust 
Layers of trust 
Large-Scale Socio-Technological System 
Epistemic Ethical Social Technological 
Particular ac-
counts sug-
gested 
Sosa (2006), 
Lehrer (1995) 
Marsh & Briggs (2009), 
Wagenknecht (2014), 
Kiran & Verbeek (2010) 
Kounelis et al. (2014),  
Nickel (2013) 
Simpson (2011), 
Lawrance (2009) 
Focus of trust Instruments 
"Unseen" norms and 
standards made explicit, 
responsibility 
Collaborative ap-
proach, institutions' re-
gulations 
Reputation cloud 
 
The ethical layer of trust is bolded as this layer constitutes the link between epistemic trust and the other layers 
of trust. All accounts of trust form a trustworthy LSSTS. 
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